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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
In addition to those issues raised by appellant in 
Case No. 15605, presently pending before this Court, 
appellant presents the following issues: 
1. The District Court erred in not releasing 
appellant from confinement at the Utah State Hospital after 
finding that he had recovered from his mental illness. 
Refusal to order appellant's release violates due process 
and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
2. The District Court erred in failing to exercise 
its authority requiring the State to provide an appropriate 
community placement for appellant. 
iii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
BERNT MURPHY, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 19824 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Bernt Murphy, appeals from the April 30, 
1985 ruling of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, presiding, 
denying his Motion for Release from the Utah State Hospital. 
Appellant's motion was made pursuant to his right for a yearly 
review of his continued incarceration at the Utah State Hospital 
after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity to the 
offense of Rape in 1972. The motion was made in accordance with 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5 (1953 as amended). 
Appellant seeks consolidation of this appeal with 
all facts and legal issues presented in Case No. 15605, insofar as 
issues in that appeal are not yet moot. Case No. 15605 is 
presently pending before this Court. Case No. 15605 is appellant's 
appeal from a similar decision rendered in February 1984 after 
appellantfs Motion for Release under the same statutory provisions 
was also denied. 
While Case No. 15605 has remained pending before this 
Court, appellant petitioned the District Court in March 1985 
for a new yearly hearing on his request for release from the 
Utah State Hospital, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5. 
Appellant alleged that he is no longer mentally ill and thereby 
must be released. He further renewed his claims that his 
continued custody at the hospital since 1972 has been illegal 
and that his continued confinement constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment. Appellant asked for alternative remedies 
including adoption of a "New-Jersey Plan" approach to 
release as requested and briefed in Case No. 15605 or an immediate 
release based upon the duties of the State to provide support 
services for appellant under the provisions of Adult Protectives 
Services Act, Utah Code Ann. §55-19-3 (1953 as amended). 
After an evidentiary hearing, all motions made by 
appellant were denied. 
Statement of Facts 
Appellant hereby incorporates by reference the Statement 
of Facts included within Case No. 15605 (pgs. 3-25) and asks the 
Court to consider all facts contained therein in conjunction 
with the following supplemental facts adduced at the evidentiary 
hearing held before Judge Dee on April 30, 1985. 
Appellant, the moving party in a §77-14-5 hearing, 
introduced into evidence two letters concerning the condition 
and/or progress of appellant since his last hearing before the 
District Court in February, 1984 (T.5,7). Addendum A is a letter 
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from appellantfs attorney dated January 26, 1985 requested of 
officials at the Utah State Hospital information concerning 
appellant's right to a yearly review and a request for updated 
information. (Addendum B), accepted into evidence by the court 
without objection, was a reply letter dated February 26, 1985. 
This report was signed by Utah State Hospital personnel, Drs. 
Van Austin, Robert Howell and Clinical Director, C. Jess Groesbeck, 
who are three of the four doctors who submitted a similar yearly 
report to the court in 1984 stating different conclusions. 
Each signatory on this letter was present and was subsequently 
called to testify. 
According to the report of February 26, 1985, appellant 
no longer suffers from a mental disease. Specifically the letter, 
Addendum B, states: 
February 28, 1985 
"Dear Judge Dee: 
The following is a yearly treatment progress 
report on Bernt Murphy: 
Since our 1984 report to the court Bernt has 
displayed some improvement. During the past year 
we have seen no indications of the signs and 
symptoms which have characterized our previous 
diagnosis of mental illness. However, he is still, 
and will remain, mildly mentally retarded. 
(Emphasis added) He continues to display 
emotional and behavioral liability and impul-
sivity, unrealistic expectations of his skills 
and abilities, poor social skills, and inappro-
priate sexual impulses and controls. Although 
these are not healthy features, they do not 
approach the threshold necessary to diagnose 
a mental illness. 
During the past year the treating staff has 
given him the opportunity to participate in 
industrial assignments. His supervisors report 
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that he has been a very good and reliable worker. 
In addition, since December he has been allowed 
to go on "home visits" to his aunts1 house in 
West Jordan and has functioned without incident. 
However, his participation in the industrial 
assignment and his last home visit were both 
curtailed as the result of recent apparently 
unprovoked violent threats to another patient 
and staff members. 
If the court continues his present commitment, 
the treatment staff plans to continue counseling, 
encourage participation in industrial assignments, 
structured participation in a sheltered workshop, 
more frequent home visits, and counseling to ensure 
that the home visits are both appropriate and 
productive. 
We are not recommending Bernt's release since 
we feel that releasing him from the State Hospital 
would be doing a disservice to Bernt and the community. 
(Emphasis added) We feel that he lacks the social 
skills and controls necessary to function anywhere 
but in a highly-structured inpatient setting and 
lacks the ability to provide for the basic necessities 
on life or his own welfare. We feel that however 
well-intentioned, his release from the State Hospital 
would rapidly become a social and individual disaster. 
(Emphasis added). 
However, we are prepared to certify to the 
court that Mr. Murphy does not currently have a 
mental disease. (Emphasis added) He does continue 
to have mild mental retardation. 
Sincerely, Van 0. Austin, M.D. Forensic Psychi-
atrist; Robert J. Howell, Ph.D., Clinical and 
Forensic Psychology; and C. Jess Groesbeck, M.D., 
Clinical Director" (T.8-11). 
Dr. Austin was called by the State on cross-examination 
to explain the differing and contradictory conclusions between 
the 1984 and 1985 reports. 
The report dated January 17, 1984 (cited in appellant's 
brief in Case No. 15605 at pg. 15) stated appellant suffered 
from: 
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Mental retardation; mild; an adult adjustment 
disorder with mixed distrubance of emotion and 
conduct. 
Yet during cross-examination at the 1984 hearing, Dr. Austin 
expanded the diagnosis contained in the report by saying that 
appellant "also suffered from a psychotic disorder". 
(Emphasis added) (Brief 15605, T. Vol. 1-195). 
His report of February, 1985 completely contradicts 
the 1984 report as well as his 1984 hearing testimony. The 
contradictions further create questions as to the reliability 
of any diagnoses of appellantfs condition by psychiatric 
personnel, not to mention the possible motives underlying changes. 
In April 1985, under cross-examination from State's Attorney 
Creighton Horton, Dr. Austin addressed that particular question: 
As As I stated in my letter of January 17, 
1984 and then went on to testify, he did have 
mild mental retardation and adult adjustment 
disorder at that time, which is primarily a 
transient disorder. 
During testimony questions were brought up 
regarding possible underlying psychosis. However, 
as I pointed out in my testimony, that was never 
really well documented by testing, and, therefore, 
was not a certainty. A suspicion perhaps, but 
never really documented and certainly not present 
during my observations of him (T.12). 
Dr. Austin went on to say: 
. . . initially there were diagnoses in the hospital 
record stating that Mr. Murphy was psychotic. In 
reviewing the medical record, however, I did not 
really see a firm basis for that diagnosis. Since 
that time the primary diagnoses have been mental 
retardation as well as various personality disorders. 
Again this is an individual call, and I cannot 
critique the doctors who make those diagnoses. 
However, at the present time I don't feel there 
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are enough personality features to make the 
diagnoses of a personality disorder (T.13). 
Finally, Dr. Austin now testifies in response to the prosecutorfs 
questions: 
Q: (Mr. Horton) Okay. In your opinion then, 
has Mr. Murphy recovered from whatever mental 
illness he may have had in the past? 
A: I believe that — I believe that he does not 
have a mental illness at the present time and, 
therefore, would have to say if he had one before, 
and I wasn't there then, but if he had one before, 
he has recovered from it. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And I don't — I want to say I don't see a 
basis, really, to make the diagnosis of a psychotic 
condition back in 1957. However, I don't — I 
didn't have the opportunity to interview him then. 
And I reviewed their notes, and based on their 
notes I would not have made a diagnosis of a 
psychotic condition at that time (T.15). 
Q: Doctor, do you have any concerns as to the 
possibility of him being dangerous to himself 
or to others if released? 
A: I think that because of his poor judgment, 
his lack of social skills, his lack of occupational 
skills, he may be a danger to himself, and because 
of his sexual maturity, and again poor judgment, 
he may be a danger to others. However, I don't 
honestly feel this is due to a mental illness 
(T.16,17) . 
Dr. Robert Howell, the Utah State Hospital Psychologist and co-
author of the 1984 and 1985 reports also now has contradicted his 
own 1984 diagnosis and testimony. At the 1984 hearing, he 
testified that in addition to being mildly retarded and having 
an adult adjustment disorder, (Brief 15605 p.15; T. Vol. 1-152): 
". . .we are dealing with a psychotic process, 
very likely schizophrenia." 
However, during his April 30, 1985 testimony, Dr. Howell 
could not recall having ever made such a diagnosis or given such 
testimony (T.24,25). Dr. Howell now relates the following: 
Q: (Mr. Horton) In your opinion has Mr. 
Murphy recovered from whatever mental illness 
he may have had previously? 
A: Certainly in my opinion he's recovered from 
the adjustment disorder. 
If you consider mental retardation a mental 
illness, and it is in the DSM III, he has not 
recovered from that nor will he ever, in my 
opinion. But if you do not, as many people 
do not, then I would say that whatever mental 
illness he had, if he ever had one, he has 
recovered from. 
Q: The second to the last paragraph of that letter 
dated February 26th of 1985, you express a concern 
about his release and do not recommend his release. 
A: I think that with the situation the way it is 
now it would be inhuman. 
Q t And what are the factors that go into that 
recommendation? 
A: I don!t think he is able to provide for himself. 
I think he is so completely and thoroughly instit-
utionalized that — that he's always going to be 
in a protective setting. And I just don!t — you 
know I think it's unfortunate, but I think that's 
true. 
Q: You indicated in that last sentence of the 
next to the last paragraph, "We feel that however 
well-intentioned, his release from the State 
Hospital would rapidly become a social and 
individual disaster." 
What do your concerns there relate to? Do 
they relate in any way to a mental illness or only 
to his retardation and personality traits? 
A: An inability to adjust in society. 
Q: Would you agree with me that over the years 
there has been some confusion as to precisely 
what, if any, mental illness Mr. Murphy has 
suffered from. 
A: I think there's been a good deal of confusion. 
I would certainly agree with that. I think there 
was some kind of a sweetheart deal between the 
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County Attorney and the hospital way back when. 
I've always felt that. I don't think he should 
have had a defense of insanity to begin with. 
Were you involved at all in — 
No. 
— those proceedings? 
No, I was not. 
You came along then after that had already 
occurred? 
A: I was there at the time. I was not involved. 
I was actually at the hospital when he came to 
the hospital the first time. 
Q: I see. 
A: But I was not involved. I was consulted on 
his case, and I said the same thing then as I've 
just got through saying (indicating). And un-
fortunately it's stubbornness on my part. 
Q: Thank you, doctor. That's all. 
THE COURT: Ms. Wells? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WELLS: 
Q: Dr. Howell, if you have believed what you just 
stated over a period of years, that being that 
Mr. Murphy probably was not mentally ill and 
should not have been defended on those grounds 
in 1972, why hasn't this been reported to the 
court before 1985? 
A: Well, I think that's a good question. And 
last year I was so concerned about his instability 
in the hospital, which we called an adjustment 
disorder, that in good conscience I couldn't 
last year. 
Q: How about in '83 or '82 or '81 or '80? 
A: You won't see my signature on anything before 
'83. 
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Q: Are you aware that Mr. Murphy has been involved 
in visits outside the hospital over the last year? 
A: I am. 
Q: So despite the fact that he has been in a 
more structured environment within the hospital, 
he has also had an opportunity to take advantage 
of some of those activities which other patients 
engaged in outside of the hospital; is that correct? 
A: That's right. 
Q: Alright, so it's possible then that his 
progress, if that's what it is, may also have 
been affected by his involvement in activities 
away from the hospital and away from that structure? 
A: I think that's a possibility. 
Q: Also are you aware that he has perhaps been 
given some opportunities to be engaged in indust-
rial type training? 
A: I was told that and so I asked about that this 
morning, and I really didn't get a very clear answer 
on that this morning. 
Q: Assuming that that is the case, though, do 
you think that is a contributory factor? 
A: I think there is a possibility it is. I 
don't think it is, but I think that's a possibility. 
Q: Doctor, did you report your feelings concerning 
Mr. Murphy's condition and lack of psychotic history 
to others who were your superiors or peers at the 
hospital? 
A: From the time I first formed that opinion. 
Q: When was that? 
When did he first come into the hospital? 
1957. 
1957. Right at the very first I did. I was 
at the hospital then. I was consulted on it. I 
said at that time I — he was — he was not competent 
to proceed at the time, if I remember right. And 
I said at that time I did not think he had a defense 
of insanity. And then later after I had — I was 
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in California at the time he was found not guilty 
by reason of insanity. But I have on many occasions 
— raised this same issue last year. I raised it 
in 1983. I've been concerned about this for many 
years. 
Q: I don't recall your testimony of last year 
as indicating what you stated today. Did you 
testify as to that or am I mistaken? 
A: No, I did not. I testified as to my concern 
over his adjustment disorder last year. 
Q: Doctor, why, when you had the opportunity to 
give testimony at that time concerning this in 
open court where it can be looked at objectively 
by other persons, did you not come forward with — 
MR. HORTON: I believe that's been asked and 
answered by the doctor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead and answer the 
question. 
A: Miss Wells, last year when I was in this court-
room every time I tried to say anything other than 
yes or no when Mr. Dazey was cross-examining me, 
you objected. You even objected to one of his 
questions and Judge Dee said you can't object to 
your own co-counsel's questions. 
A: Alright, despite my strategic interruption 
did you — why did you not approach Mr. Horton 
with that or myself while we were not — 
A: Yeah 
Q: — in session? 
A: I think Itold you at the prison that I didn't 
think he had a definite — that I thought this 
was a wrong finding. And I don't recall if I have 
ever talked to Mr. Horton about this or not. Bernt 
Murphy is precisely one of the reasons why Dr. 
Austin and I co-authored a bill trying to make 
it more difficult to use the insanity plea. He's 
not the only example, but he is one of many 
examples of where in an immediate situation we 
think we're getting rid of a problem and the 
problem just gets bigger, and bigger and bigger. 
This was precisely my motivations for participating 
in writing the new bill on insanity. (Indicating) 
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Q: When was that bill effective? 
A: It became effective March 31st, 1983. 
Q: Before we had the evidentiary hearing last 
year on Mr. Murphy? (Indicating) 
A: That's right. 
(T.28-34) 
Dr. C. Jess Groesbeck, Clinical Director of the Utah 
State Hospital in both 1984 and 1985 certified to the court 
that appellant does not currently have a mental illness (T. 37). 
Appellant has recovered from any mental illnesses he may have 
had in the past. (T. 37) Groesbeck concurred with Drs. Austin 
and Kowell that mental retardation is not a mental illness 
(T. 36). 
Despite the Court's express and continued empathy 
with appellant's position and agreement with this legal 
position (T. p. 39), the Court denied appellant's motion for 
immediate release. Judge Dee stated: 
"I think the creation of a treating facility of 
a kind not available in this jurisdiction is the 
ultimate bottom line the [Supreme] Court has to 
look at." (T. p. 39). . . . 
I don't know how to order recreation of a lifestyle 
for Mr. Murphy." (T. p. 45) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant incorporates by reference all facts and legal 
issues raised in his case No. 15605, presently pending before 
this Court. Appellant requests consolidation of both appeals 
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to the extent that issues raised in this appeal, No. 19824, do 
not render moot legal issues raised in Case No. 15605. 
While Case No. 15605 has remained pending before this 
Court, appellant petitioned the District Court in March 1985 
for a new yearly hearing on his request for release from the 
Utah State Hospital, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5. 
Appellant alleged that he is no longer mentally ill and thereby 
must be released. He further renewed his claims that his continued 
custody at the hospital since 1972 has been illegal and that 
his continued confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
Appellant asked for alternative remedies including adoption 
of a "New-Jersey Plan", approach to release as requested and briefed 
in Case No. 15605, or an immediate release based upon the duties 
of the State to provide support services for appellant under 
the provisions of the Adult Protectives Services Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §55-19-3 (1953 as amended). 
After an evidentiary hearing, all motions made by 
appellant were denied. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant seeks consolidation of this appeal with all 
facts and legal issues presented by appellant in Case No. 
15605, insofar as previously raised issues are not yet moot. 
Appellant further seeks reversal of the 1984 and 1985 rulings 
of the District Court denying release and an Order that the cases 
-12-
be remanded to the District Court with authorization for that 
Court to order the State of Utah, through its varied agencies 
to implement a plan to be scrutinized by the court, whereby appellant 
will be released from the Utah State Hospital into an appropriate 
community placement with appropriate support services. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT RELEASING APPELLANT 
FROM CONFINEMENT AT THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL AFTER 
FINDING THAT HE HAD RECOVERED FROM HIS MENTAL 
ILLNESS. REFUSAL TO ORDER APPELLANT'S RELEASE 
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5 (1953 as amended) states: 
(3) A defendant committed to the Utah State 
Hospital pursuant to subsection (2) may apply, 
. . . to the District Court . . . for an order 
of release on the grounds that he has recovered 
from his mental illness. 
This provision is neither made conditional nor 
qualified. Therefore, upon such a finding, an order of release 
from the District Court is mandatory. Refusal to order at least 
a provisional release is in error and constitutes forbidden 
criminal punishment. United States Constitution, Fifth and 
Eighth Amendments. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7. 
The evidence before the District Court as of April 30, 
1985, is that appellant, although being mildly retarded, suffers 
from no mental illness, if, in fact, he ever had one. The letter 
dated February 28, 1985 from the Clinical Director of the Utah 
State Hospital, as well as other professional personnel, in 
addition to the testimony of those individuals so certifies and 
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are the basis for the court's conclusion. 
Once a finding of recovery has been made, the statute 
requires no further inquiry by the court. However, appellant 
recognized that this court in State v. Jacob, 669 P.2d 865 
(1984) found constitutional the District Court's use of a 
"dangerousness"criteria as an additional factor in the decision 
to release or not release an insanity acquitee. 
Appellant argues the inapplicability of this criteria 
on two grounds. First, Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5(3), quoted above, 
concerning release does not address the issue of release. Only 
in §77-14-5(2) is the question of dangerousness addressed. That 
subsection deals only with the initial commitment to the Utah 
State Hospital of an insanity acquitee. Such a commitment order 
can only be made: 
". . .If the appellant is still mentally 
ill and because of that mental illness, 
presents a substantial danger to himself 
or others." 
Appellant argues that use of the criteria contained in subsection 
(2) but not in subsection (3), in order to continue his 
confinement, constitutes an ex post facto application of that 
law. United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10; Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 18. However, if the Court 
were not to find application of subsection (2) violative, the 
evidence is clear that appellant's alleged "dangerousness" 
is not the result of any mental illness, but rather the result 
of being retarded and institutionalized. 
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Additionally/ the allegations from hospital personnel 
that appellant should not be released on the grounds he might 
be a danger to himself since without assistance he doesn't 
have the skills of survival, is easily distinguishable from the 
evidence of dangerousness found in Jacob, supra, 
Jacob, confined at the hospital less than two years, 
is a schizophrenic, requiring use of anti-psychotic drugs to 
control his behavior as well as his stated obsessions with 
sexual perversions and the potential commission of violent 
acts. The finding of the District Court was that Jacob was 
"extraordinarily dangerous to himself and others." Jacob, supra 
(pg. 3). Jacob is mentally ill and because of his mental 
illness he presentes a substantial danger to himself and others. 
Appellant, unlike Jacob, is retarded and institutionalized. 
He does not require medication. He is not delusional. The 
unfounded suggestions of his potential dangerousness are made 
by those who are responsible for his institutionalization and 
whose individual levels of credibility are questionable. 
Additionally, conclusions that appellant is 
unable to live outside the environs of the Utah State Hospital 
are unfounded. Hospital personnel have conceded (T.30-31) 
(Addendum B) that during the last year —• when finally so 
allowed — appellant has benefited from home visits and minimal 
job training. 
In summary, then, continued confinement at the Utah 
State Hospital can only be based upon the fact that, as a 
retarded, dependent person, appellant cannot be expected to 
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be able to reside within a less structured setting outside 
the Utah State Hospital. To continue confinement on these 
grounds exceeds the authority of the State to exercise its 
health and general welfare powers and is prohibited, as it 
punishes, perhaps for life, on the basis of appellant's 
status as a retarded individual. Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO 
THE 
EXERCISE 
STATE TO 
ITS AUTHORITY 
PROVIDE AN 
REQUIRING 
APPROPRIATE 
COMMUNITY PLACEMENT FOR APPELLANT. 
Once having determined that appellant is not mentally 
ill, it was the duty of the District Court to order appellant's 
release from the hospital. 
However, recognizing the special requirements and 
support required for appellant to overcome his 28 years of 
institutionalization and meet his needs as a retarded person 
living within a community, appellant did not ask the District 
Court for an immediate release. To do so would be insensitive 
and inhuman. Rather, appellant requested the court to exercise 
its pre-existing authority. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-5(3) authorizes the District 
Court to order relase of a patient previously determined to be 
mentally ill. It is incomprehensible to believe that given 
such an immense power the court was not also inherently 
empowered to require that such a person receive the support 
of the State in resuming or creating a life outside the hospital. 
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Just as a trial judge utilizes the resources of 
state agencies to supervise a probationer, the District Court 
has the authority to order appropriate state agencies to provide 
necessary support services for a person discharged from a 
mental institutuion. Such support services are provided to 
prison parolees. Former residents of American Fork Traning 
School now reside in community group homes. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4 (1953 as amended) enumerates 
the powers of the District Court, including the power to: 
" . . . issue writs . . . of mandamus 
. . . or any other writs necessary 
to carry into effect their orders, 
judgments and decrees." 
Several alternatives were suggested such as 
adootion of a olan similar to that accepted by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in In Re Commitment of S.L., 462 P.2d 1252 (New 
Jersey 1983) (also cited in appellant's brief in Case No. 
15605) in which that court held that requiring the State 
to establish and follow a format of gradual release of discharged 
mental patients no longer commitable was an appropriate exercise 
of the State's parens patriae powers. The District Court 
declined to exercise its power and order implementation of such 
a plan. It also declined to order release with attendant supoort 
services to be provided pursuant to either the Adult Protective 
Services Act, Utah Code Ann. §55-19-1 throuqh §55-19-9 (1953 
as amended) as well as the duties of the Clinical Director 
of the Utah State Hospital as they pertain to discharged 
patients, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §64-7-30 (1953 as 
amended). 
Utah Code Ann. §55-19-1(1) (1953 as amended) defines 
a disabled adult as: 
" . . . any person eighteen years of 
age or older who is impaired because 
of mental deficiency . . . or other 
cause to the extent that he or she 
is unable to care for his or her own 
personal safety or to provide necessities 
such as food, shelter, clothing and 
medical care. 
Utah Code Ann. §55-19-1(2) defines the "protective 
services" to be provided for disabled adults as: 
" . . . [t]hose services . . . furnished 
by . . . the Department of Social Servies 
. . . or any agency obligated by contract 
to provide such services to assist persons 
in need of protection to prevent or cause 
discontinuance of abuse, neglect or 
exploitation until the condition no 
longer requires intervention consistent, 
if at all possible, to the accustomed life 
style of the adult . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. §55-19-1(4) (1953 as amended) defines 
"protected persons" as: 
"those adults for whom the Court has 
ordered protection . . . " 
The Division of Family Services is, pursuant to this act 
required: 
"to develop a plan for a coordinated 
protective services program . . . 
with the goal of insuring that every 
person in need of protection will have 
easy access to those services." 
Utah Code Ann. §55-19-3 (1953 as 
amended). 
Additional authority for post-release support services 
can be found in Utah Code Ann. §64-7-30 (1953 as amended) which 
requires: 
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". . . [that upon discharge of a 
patient from the Utah State Hospital] 
an effort shall be made to assure that 
any further supportive services required 
to meet the patients1 needs upon release 
will be provided . . . ." 
Although Utah has not before specifically addressed 
this problem, having declined release in Jacob, supra, the 
questions posed have been decided by the federal district 
courts in favor of appellants. 
A pattern of requiring federal district courts to 
inquire into courses of treatment as alternatives to hospital 
confinement has been in existence for at least twenty years. 
In Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D. C. Cir. 1966) as a result 
of a Habeas Corpus proceeding brought after the District Court 
denied petitioners request for relief from hospitalization 
in a mental facility, remanded the case to the District Court 
with an order that alternatives be explored. Petioner Lake 
was senile, had poor memory, wandered, and was unable to take 
care of herself, she was nonetheless not confinable. 
The District Court was required to investigate 
treatment alternatives with every effort to be made to find 
a course of treatment the petitioner herself would find 
acceptable. 
The United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia in Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (1975) 
addressed the specific issue of governmental responsibility for 
post-release support. In those instances where individuals 
were still in need of psychiatric care despite their readiness 
for placement in alternative facilities, a duty to provide such 
treatment was ruled to be the responsibility of governmental 
entities. 
The District Court's refusal to order release 
with the requisite supportive services given its implicit and 
explicit authority, constitutes error and inflicts upon 
appellant additional illegal punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
Failure to order appellantfs release after certification 
from the Utah State Hospital that he is no longer insane or has 
regained his sanity is an error of the District Court resulting 
in continued illegal and unconstitutional punishment. 
The District Court has the express and implied 
authority to order the State of Utah, through any of its 
agencies, to provide an appropriate post-release living 
environment away from the confines of the Utah State Hospital. 
Failure of the District Court to exercise this authority on 
the grounds that because of his retardation and twenty eight 
years of institutionalization confinement must be continued at the 
hospital is constitutionally prohibited since it constitutes cruel 
an unusual punishment upon one who has the status of being retarded. 
For all the reasons stated above, the case should be 
remanded to the District with instructions that appellant be 
released from the Utah State Hsopital under an appropriate 
post-release treatment plan. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ Y day of May, 1985. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, BROOKE C. WELLS, hereby certify that four copies 
of the foregoin brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this ^ day of May, 1985. 
O^j^U (A)JU&UJ 
I, , delivered the 
foregoing copies this day of May, 1985. 
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SALT LAKE LEGAL L PNDER ASSOCIATION 
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SALT LAKE 
TELEPHONE 
532-1021 
Misdemeanor Division 
COND F.^sr 
' U I AH 84 111 
TELFPHONE 
532-5414 
Felony Division 
JOHN HILL 
P' rp r to r 
OAPC OF TRUSTEES 
OBERT VAN SCIVER 
Chairman 
GILBERT ATHAY 
Ex-Offiao 
ONEL FRANKEL 
Ml MITSUNAGA 
IENE NIELSEN 
AY GROUSSMAN 
TEWART HANSON, Jr 
DN HINDE 
\Y LOWE 
DHN OCONNELL 
DSEPH A GETER 
Tebrua ry 5 , 1985 
Dr. Van O. A u s t i n 
Utah S t a t e H o s p i t a l 
P .O. Box 270 
P r o v o , Utah 84601 
Dear Dr. Austin: 
Re: Bernt Murphy 
Although last yoar's decision by Judge Dee nol to 
release Bernt is presently on appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court, it is necessary to continue to afford Bernt his right to 
a yearly review. Therefom, before determining whether or not 
to schedule a formal evidentiary hearing, I am requesting that 
you forward to me, the Salt Lake County Attorney, and to the 
Court an evaluation of Bernt's condition, status, and progress 
during 1984. 
Si ncerely, 
pupokn c. wr.i i,s 
Attorney at Law 
i' ; r ( ( 
BCW:ps 
c c : Judge David 13. Deo 
C r e i g h t o n I lor ton 
B e r n t Murphy 
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UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 
100 Years Of Service 
February 26, 1985 
The Honorable David B. Dee 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
re: MURPHY, Bernt 
Case Number: 15606 
Dear Judge Dee: 
The following is a yearly treatment progess report on Bernt Murphy: 
Since our 1984 report to the court Bernt has displayed some improvement. 
During the past year we have seen no indicationss of the signs and symptoms 
which have characterized our previous diagnosis of mental illness. However, 
he is still, and will remain, mildly mentally retarded. He continues to 
display emotional and behavioral lability and impulsivity, unrealistic 
expectations of his skills and abilities, poor social skills, and inappro-
priate sexual impulses and controls. Although these are not healthy 
features, they do not approach the threshold necessary to diagnose a 
mental illness. 
During the past year the treating staff has given him the opportunity 
to participate in industrial assignments. His supervisors report that 
he has been a very good and reliable worker. In addition, since December 
he has been allowed to go on "home visits" to his aunts' house in West 
Jordan and has functioned without incident. However, his participation in 
the industrial assignment and his last home visit were both curtailed as the 
result of recent apparently unprovoked violent threats to another patient 
and staff members. 
If the court"continues his present commitment, the treatment staff plans to 
continue counseling, encourage participation in industrial assignments, 
structured participation in a sheltered workshop, more frequent home visits, 
and counseling to ensure that the home visits are both appropriate and 
and productive. 
S OCl8l S©rvlC0$ * n *QV*I Opportunity Employ* Seymour P. Steed. Ed 0 . Superintendent 
Norman H. Bangerter. Governor, State of Utah 1300 East Center 
*'- i~pnn G. Angus. Execi/trve Director PO. Box 270. Provo. Utah 84603-0270 
(801) 373-4400 
Judge David B. Dee 2 February 26, 1985 
We are not recommending Bernt's release since we feel that releasing 
him from the state hospital would be doing a disservice to Bernt and 
the community. We feel that he lacks the social skills and controls 
necessary to function anywhere but in a highly-structured inpatient 
eetting and lacks the ability to provide for the basic necessities of 
life or his own welfare. We feel that however well-intentioned, his 
release from the state hospital would rapidly become a social and 
individual disaster. 
However, we are prepared to certify to the court that Mr. Murphy does 
not currently have a mental disease. He does continue to have mild 
mental retardation. 
Sincerely, 
Xm 0. (WJM - \w 
VAN 0. AUSTIN, M.D. 
Forensic Psychiatrist 
ROBERT J. HOWELL, Ph.D. 
Clinical and Forensic Psychology 
C. JESS GROESBECK, M.D. 
Clinical Director 
VOA:lc 
cc: Creighton Horton, Esg., Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Brooke Wells, Esg., Defense Attorney 
Byron Stark, Salt Lake County Clerk's Office 
